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GUN REFORM BY “ANY MEANS NECESSARY” 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, Congress passed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 
(“PLCAA”), shielding gun manufacturers1 from liability whenever the misuse2 
of a firearm3 causes harm.4 
PLCAA is important for two reasons: (1) it provides gun manufacturers and 
distributors blanket immunity for gun violence and, in doing so; (2) it hinders 
the natural product reform process. This essay will discuss how PLCAA has 
interrupted the natural product reform process and how stakeholders who 
desire tougher gun control can use their resources as a means of advocacy. The 
natural product reform process is the process by which products are improved 
and/or refined through the affects of the consumer market, technology, 
innovation, and law suits.  
I. BLANKET IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY PROVIDES A FREE PASS TO GUN 
MANUFACTURERS 
The immunity under PLCAA provides a free pass to gun manufacturers 
from any liability for gun violence.5 PLCAA states that “[a] qualified civil 
liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court.”6 A “qualified 
civil liability action” is a civil action or administrative proceeding brought by 
any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or 
a trade association, for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or 
 
 1 Essentially, liability is also precluded for the gun industry as a whole including distributors, dealers, 
and importers. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (2012). 
 2 Misuse, a term of art within products liability, refers to a product being mishandled or put to an 
abnormal or unforeseeable use. It is a common defense. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS PROD. LIAB. § 17 
(1998).  
 3 In this paper, whenever I refer to firearms or gun, the term is intended to include ammunition. If a 
plaintiff could not go after the gun manufacturer or the gun manufacturer may not have been the cause of the 
issue, a plaintiff could sue the seller of the ammunition. See Hetherton v. Sears Roebuck Co., 593 F.2d 526 
(3rd Cir. 1979). 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 7901. 
 5 Because the PLCAA requires State and Federal courts to dismiss any civil action or administrative 
proceeding, no form of liability for criminal gun violence can ever attach to a gun manufacturer because the 
means of doing so have been taken away. See 15 U.S.C. § 7902. 
 6 15 U.S.C. § 7902.  
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declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other 
relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified 
product by the person or a third party . . . .”7 
The term “qualified product” means a firearm, including antique firearms, 
ammunition, or any component part of a firearm or ammunition.8 Thus, 
PLCAA precludes liability to gun manufacturers whenever a gun is used in a 
criminal act and harms another person. In addition, retroactive effect of 
PLCAA has been affirmed by courts as comporting with the notions of due 
process.9 
In 2009, City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., a case BROUGHT by 
the City of New York against gun manufacturers and dealers was decided after 
nine years.10 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari after the 
Second Circuit ordered the case to be dismissed under PLCAA.11 In the case, 
the City of New York accused gun manufacturers of violating the state’s 
nuisance law by putting its products in illicit markets which created a condition 
that negatively affected the public health and safety.12 The court held that New 
York’s nuisance statute was not an applicable exception to maintain a suit 
against a gun manufacturer under PLCAA.13 
To be clear, PLCAA does not prohibit claimants from filing all causes of 
action against a gun manufacturer.14 PLCAA specifically proscribes those 
claims relating to criminal gun violence.15 Therefore, if a company 
manufactured a gun that automatically fired when held in a certain position, the 
injured person could sue the maker of the gun for design defect, manufacturing 
defect, breach of expressed/implied warranty, or a failure to warn. However, if 
a person robbed a bank and purposefully shot a customer in the bank, the 
 
 7 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5).  
 8 15 U.S.C. § 7903(4).  
 9 Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 563 F.3d 1126, 1140‒42 (9th. Cir. 2009) (PLCAA does not impose a procedural 
limitation; rather, it creates a substantive rule of law granting immunity to certain parties against certain types 
of claims. In such a case, “the legislative determination provides all the process that is due.”). 
 10 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2nd Cir, 2008), cert. denied 556 U.S. 1104 
(2009). 
 11 Id.  
 12 David Stout, Justices Decline New York Gun Suit, NY TIMES, (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/washington/10guns.html?_r=0. 
 13 City of New York, 524 F.3d at 400.  
 14 A qualified civil liability action does not include negligent entrustment, negligence per se, a claim for 
the violation of state or Federal statute regarding sale or marketing, breach of contract or warranty, and defect 
in design or manufacture. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5).  
 15 Id.  
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injured customer could not sue the manufacturer of the gun the robber used to 
commit the crime. PLCAA prohibits the sort of claims that would arise in the 
latter scenario. 
Some opponents of stricter gun control laws might use a common slogan 
associated with the National Rifle Association and argue that “guns don’t kill 
people, people kill people.”16 This notion suggests that guns require human 
interaction to harm others and that a gun cannot harm a person by itself. 
Proponents of gun reform, however, claim that while “guns may not kill 
people . . . people with guns do, and they do so more often and more efficiently 
than people without guns.”17 Essentially this counterargument and others like 
it, claims that guns enable people to kill people. 
Both of these rhetorical arguments wrestle with the issue of whether gun 
manufacturers should be liable when a third party uses its product in a manner 
unintended to commit a crime. However, this paper will not debate whether 
gun manufacturers should or should not be liable for gun violence under 
PLCAA. It will simply serve to highlight that blanket immunity for gun 
violence under PLCAA hinders the natural product reform process and bring to 
the forefront a possible new form of advocacy for gun reform. 
II. PLCAA INTERFERES WITH THE NATURAL PRODUCT REFORM PROCESS 
Manufactured goods evolve over time due not only to improved technology 
and innovative ideas, but also, products liability lawsuits.18 Products liability 
litigation is a means to ensure that a company is held responsible when it is 
negligent.19 When a product is faulty or when a company cuts too many 
corners in making its product, the company may be held liable to harmed 
 
 16 Robert Deis, Some People Say “Guns don’t kill people.” Other People Say. . ., 
QUOTECOUNTERQUOUTE, (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.quotecounterquote.com/2011/03/guns-dont-kill-people-
people-kill.html. 
 17 Debunking The “Guns Don’t Kill People, People Kill People” Myth, ARMEDWITHREASON, (Oct. 8, 
2013), http://www.armedwithreason.com/debunking-the-guns-dont-kill-people-people-kill-people-myth/. 
 18 See Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000); Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 618 N.W.2d 
827 (Neb. 2000); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 79 F.3d 12 (2nd Cir. 1996); Gurski v. Wyeth, 953 F.Supp. 412 (D. 
Ma. 1997). See also John Villasenor, Products Liability and Driverless Cars: Issues and Guiding Principles 
for Legislations, 2014 CENTER FOR TECH. & INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS 14 (discussing that potential 
manufacturer liability may delay or hamper the commercial use of driverless cars) available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/04/products%20liability%20driverless%20cars
%20villasenor/products_liability_and_driverless_cars.pdf. 
 19 Villasenor, at 7.  
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consumers.20 Through products liability, the defective product is brought to the 
attention of the manufacturing company.21 Products liability causes of action 
give consumers an outlet to vocalize their claims and invoke their legal right to 
safe products. 22 By protecting gun companies from this form of liability for 
gun violence, Congress silenced the consumers’ voice and their rights.23 The 
removal of products liability as an available cause of action to consumers helps 
to eliminate or substantially reduce gun manufacturers’ financial liability to 
consumers for gun violence.24 
This reduction of financial liability hampers gun reform. If a company is 
subjected to burdensome litigation over a product it produces, the company 
will have a tremendous incentive to fix the issue or try to alleviate the problem 
as best as it can to avoid facing such litigation. Therefore, a company, through 
this process, will take proactive measures to constantly modify or improve its 
products (even if there is nothing “wrong”) to safeguard against potential 
litigation. In fact, in products liability litigation, evidence of a later change in 
design cannot be used against a company to prove negligence of defective 
design.25 As a policy matter, society does not want companies to refrain from 
making beneficial changes to products in fear that the change will be used 
against them in court. 
To be sure, the natural reform process is not perfect. If a company sold a 
dangerous product and was still able to make a profit off of the product, then at 
the end of the day it was advantageous for the company to manufacture the 
dangerous product. The imperfectness of the reform system is perhaps best 
illustrated by a car manufactured in the 1970s with a major defect, the Ford 
Pinto.26 In manufacturing the infamous Ford Pinto, Ford Motor Company 
knowingly produced a vehicle that was susceptible to gas tank rupture upon 
 
 20 Id.  
 21 Hugh Jum Bissell, Rolling Back Legal Immunity for the Gun Industry, DAILY KOS, (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/01/14/1178835/-Rolling-Back-Legal-Immunity-for-the-Gun-Industry#. 
 22 “Often, the threat of lawsuits alone provide a powerful financial incentive to an industry to make its 
products safer, and reduce the risks associated with the use of their products.” Id.  
 23 See id. (“Until the passage of the PLCAA, no entire industry got such broad amnesty on the whole 
litigation process: neither automobile makers nor the pharmaceutical industry enjoys such protections, two 
industries that are common subjects of consumer liability suits.”). 
 24 See id. (“The NRA has stated that the PLCAA is ‘vitally important’ to end efforts by gun control 
groups to ‘bankrupt the American firearms industry through reckless lawsuits.’). 
 25 Fed. R. Evid. 407. However, evidence of a later change in design can be used to prove feasibility of a 
reasonable alternative design. Id.  
 26 Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 1977), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness?page=1. 
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impact, resulting in potential injuries or death for its passengers.27 Ford was 
exposed to hundreds of lawsuits related to the Pinto and subsequently paid out 
millions of dollars in damages.28 
The Ford Pinto was designed according to a 2000/2000 rule in which the 
car was not to weigh over 2000 pounds and cost the consumer no more than 
$2,000.29 Cost-benefit analysis showed that it was cheaper to pay out all of the 
anticipated personal injury claims rather than recall the Pinto.30 A recall would 
have cost Ford $137 million.31 It was $11 per car to change the gas tank 
multiplied by 12.5 million, the number of Pintos Ford estimated it would 
manufacture.32 Ford estimated that the total liability from consumer claims 
would reach only $49.5 million.33 Ford also estimated that 180 deaths would 
occur as a result of the Pinto’s defect,34 with each life being valued at a 
compensatory value of $200,000.35 Ultimately, Ford estimated that it would 
save $87.5 million by not recalling existing Pintos and fixing future Pintos. 
For Ford, it was simply more advantageous for it to make a dangerous 
product, at least from a financial perspective. So it did. But products liability 
did play an important role in this case. Eventually, Ford stopped manufacturing 
the Pinto after 1980. Ford recalled the Pinto on June 9, 1978,36 four months 
after receiving a devastating jury verdict in a suit alleging a defect in the Pinto. 
In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,37 after a six-month jury trial, the jury returned 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for punitive damages in the amount of $125 
 
 27 Id.  
 28 W. Michael Hoffman, The Ford Pinto, in CASE STUDIES IN BUSINESS ETHICS 222, 226 (5th ed. 2004). 
 29 Dowie, supra note 28.  
 30 Id.  
 31 Id.  
 32 Wendi Lewis, Ford Memo: The Smoking Gun, FIGHTING INJUSTICE (May 5, 2009), 
http://www.rightinginjustice.com/news/2009/05/05/ford-memo-the-smoking-gun/. 
 33 Id. 
 34 The cost-benefit analysis also included amounts for burn victims who were seriously injured ($67,000) 
and amounts for those that had minor injuries ($700). Id.  
 35 Ford’s estimate of the value of human life not only put a numerical value on life but also contributed to 
Ford knowingly putting people in substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death. Christopher Leggett, The 
Ford Pinto Case: The Valuation of Life as it Applies to the Negligence-Efficiency Argument, 1999 LAW & 
VALUATION AT WAKE FOREST U., (“Ford is essence adopted a policy of allowing a certain number of people 
to die or be injured even though they could have prevented it. When taken on a case-by-case basis the decision 
seems to be a blatant disregard for human life.”) available at 
https://users.wfu.edu/palmitar/Law&Valuation/Papers/1999/Leggett-pinto.html. 
 36 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/results.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE&year=1975&make=
FORD&model=PINTO&component_id=0&TYPENUM=1&summary=true. 
 37 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).  
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million.38 Fortunately for Ford, that amount was substantially reduced to $3.5 
million on remittitur by the trial judge.39 The amount of punitive damages was 
upheld on appeal in 1981.40 Nonetheless, this amount exponentially surpassed 
Ford’s calculations of $200,000 per death. Ultimately, Ford may have had to 
stop manufacturing the Pinto in order to save its public image and the company 
from potential bankruptcy.41 Here, the natural reform process, including 
products liability, adversely affected Ford financially enough for it to pull the 
defective product off the market before the company could face further 
potentially devastating liability.42 
It is clear that products liability is an aspect of the market. By removing the 
risk of products liability litigation and insulating gun manufacturers from 
liability, Congress has not only limited market effect but also the natural 
reform process. Because gun manufacturers are precluded from this type of 
natural reform process by the PLCAA, it is up to society as a whole to 
advocate the reforms it wants in place or seek repeal of the PLCAA. One major 
driving force for reform of product designs can be Stakeholder Advocacy. 
III.  THE NEWTOWN CONNECTION TO STAKEHOLDER ADVOCACY 
The Newtown school shooting presents an example of how stakeholder 
advocacy may work. On the morning of December 14, 2012, a tragic school 
shooting occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Connecticut.43 The 
gunman, Adam Lanza, arrived at the school with three guns, a semi-automatic 
AR-15 assault rifle made by Bushmaster, and pistols made by Glock and Sig 
 
 38 Id. at 771. 
 39 Id. at 823. The judge found that the award for $125 million in punitive damages was excessive given 
that it was $122 million more than the compensatory damages and also 44 times compensatory damages. Id. at 
822.  
 40 Id. at 757.  
 41 See Auto Editors of Consumer Guide, 1971‒1980 Ford Pinto, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://auto.howstuffworks.com/1971-1980-ford-pinto12.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2013) (citing LEE IACOCCA 
& SONNY KLEINFIELD, TALKING STRAIGHT (1989)) (“Clamming up is what we did at Ford in the late ‘70s 
when we were bombarded with suits over the Pinto, which was involved in a lot of gas tank fires. The suits 
might have bankrupted the company, so we kept our mouths shut for fear of saying anything that just one jury 
might have construed as an admission of guilt. Winning in court was our top priority; nothing else mattered. 
And of course, our silence added to all the suspicions people had about us and the car.”). 
 42 But cf. Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991) 
(discussing that the numbers in the Ford Pinto Memo do not actually represent Ford’s tort liability but the 
liability of automotive industry as a whole). 
 43 Sandy Hook shooting: What happened?, CNN, (last visited Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hook-timeline/. 
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Sauer.44 Lanza broke into a classroom and used the semi-automatic rifle to kill 
a teacher and all fourteen kindergarten students in the room.45 After this, Lanza 
made his way into another classroom and killed another teacher and six more 
kindergarten students.46 The death toll ultimately amounted to twenty-six 
people, twenty elementary school students and six adults.47 
Consequently, neither the survivors of Sandy Hook nor the relatives of 
those killed can file a claim of action against the manufacturer of the semi-
automatic gun, Bushmaster. Why? The PLCCA prohibits it. The PLCAA 
requires both state and federal courts to dismiss any qualified civil liability 
claim (including criminal actions) for misuse.48 Although products liability 
may be a closed door for the families affected by Sandy Hook, there is an 
alternative avenue available for them to seek justice. This alternative avenue is 
gun control advocacy driven by stakeholders. 
This form of advocacy is what enticed Cerebus Capital Management 
(“Cerebus”) to put Freedom Group up for sale. Cerebus is a private equity and 
hedge fund owned by billionaire “buyout king” Stephen A. Feinburg.49 Mr. 
Feinburg “acquire[s] undervalued companies, often with borrowed money, 
fix[es] them up and either take[s] them public or sell[s] [them] at a profit to 
someone else.”50 Cerebus owns the gun manufacturer, Freedom Group.51 
Freedom Group is the maker of the .223 Bushmaster semi-automatic rifle that 
was used in the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School.52 After a 
telephone call with the California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
(“Calstrs”), Cerebus announced it planned to sell Freedom Group.53 Calstrs 
 
 44 Id.  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id.  
 48 The term ‘qualified’ refers to a claim brought by any person against a manufacturer arising from 
criminal or unlawful misuse except claims relating to . . . (2) negligent entrustment or negligence per se, (3) 
seller or manufacturer violation of state or federal statute concerning sale or marketing, (4) breach of contract 
or warranty regarding sale of product (5) design defect or manufacture defect. . . 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2012). 
 49 Peter Lattman, In an Unusual Move, Cerebus to Sell Gun Company, DEAL BOOK (Dec. 18, 2012, 5:54 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/cerberus-to-sell-gunmaker-freedom-group/.  
 50 Natasha Singer, How Freedom Group Became the Big Shot, DEAL BOOK (Nov. 26, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/business/how-freedom-group-became-the-gun-industrys-
giant.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0. 
 51 Andrew R. Sorkin, Wall Street, Invested in Firearms, Is Unlikely to Push for Reforms, DEAL BOOK 
(Dec. 20, 2012, 5:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/wall-street-invested-in-firearms-is-
unlikely-to-push-for-reform/. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Lattman, supra note 53.  
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raised concerns to Cerebus in the telephone call about the company’s 
ownership of Freedom Group.54 Calstrs, a public pension fund, has $750 
million invested in Cerebus and is one of Cerebus’ most influential investors.55 
Even though Cerebus putting Freedom Group up for sale is not exactly gun 
reform, it does not have to be. The sale of Cerebus illustrates the power that 
people in a group can have to effect larger change. In the future, instead of 
putting up a gun manufacturer like Freedom Group for sale, stakeholders can 
make demands because the gun manufacturer will want the stakeholders to 
remain invested with its company. Those demands can be based on gun 
reform. 
IV.  STAKEHOLDER ADVOCACY 
Although Cerebus’ action to put Freedom Group up for sale appears to be a 
“rare” action, it was fostered by a large investor with the power to persuade. 
Private companies, as stated by former New York Governor Elliot Spitzer,56 
are immune to public demand but not pressure put on by its own investors.57 
Mr. Spitzer goes on to state that “Every student at a university should ask the 
university if it is invested in Cerberus. Every member of a union should ask 
their pension-fund managers if they are invested. Information is the key first 
step. From there, action will quickly follow.”58 This sort of inquiry represents 
the kinds of pressure society can place on investors. However, mere 
questioning is not sufficient. And while knowledge is always a first step, action 
is the necessary step. To be effective, people must, after acquiring knowledge, 
be able to advocate by demanding withdrawal or reform. 
Why is stakeholder advocacy needed? Though Ford Pinto may be an 
extreme example, the idea of cost-benefit analysis used to determine design 
(including safety) features is a hallmark for business.59 American companies 
are known for their “M.O.E.” nature.60 The term M.O.E. is vernacular for the 
phrase “money over everything,” which is used in hip-hop culture to represent 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id.  
 56 Mr. Spitzer is also a past New York State Attorney General. Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id.  
 59 This statement does not mean that a business should not conduct a cost-benefit analysis, in fact, it may 
be necessary to ensure a profitable business. However the cost-benefit analysis can be a double-edged sword.  
 60 See Lattman, supra note 53 (stating that Wall Street firms usual adhere to a ‘profit-at-all-costs ethos.’); 
Dowie, supra note 28 (“The process of willfully trading lives for profits is built into corporate capitalism.”).  
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an attitude that places a high priority on money as being more important than 
anything else, including people.61 Both a company and its executives can and 
do have notorious reputations. Corporate executives are often typecast as 
carnivorous, stealthy creatures like the wolf,62 and some companies have been 
known to utilize questionable practices such as the use of sweatshops.63 
Profit is the main initiative of any company. When producing a harmful 
product becomes more detrimental for a company than it can afford, then and 
only then, will the company take a serious look into reforming its practices. 
Because the interests of a company and the interests of consumers can be at 
odds, products liability suits provide consumers a channel through which they 
can voice their grievances. But PLCAA has taken away this channel for 
victims of gun violence, thereby affecting natural product reform. 
Since PLCAA declares product liability suits as invalid causes of action, 
part of the system of natural product reform is not available to the victims of 
gun violence.64 Because it is not available, if society wants changes it must 
find a new way to advocate on behalf of gun reform. One new possible avenue 
is to advocate change through stakeholders. Stakeholders would have to 
organize and demand reform. Stakeholders can advocate for tougher gun laws, 
like extensive background checks, a waiting period, banning certain guns from 
civilian ownership, and even ask that manufacturers invest in innovative 
technology to produce some sort of “smart gun.”65 Stakeholders could also 
demand gun companies to invest in the development of creative safety 
precautions and the transferability of available technology such as fingerprint 
analysis, GPS tracking, automatic shut off or voice recognition to guns.66 
Another idea could be the creation of a fund in which all gun manufacturers 
are required to donate a portion of their annual profits and that is dedicated to 
those affected by gun violence. 
 
 61 See DRAKE, HEADLINES (Cash Money 2011). 
 62 See Charles V. Bagli, A New Breed of Wolf At the Corporate Door, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1997, at D1.  
 63 See WALTER LAFEBER, MICHAEL JORDAN AND THE NEW GLOBAL CAPITALISM 153‒55 (expanded ed. 
2002). 
 64 As mentioned earlier PLCAA protects gun manufacturers from liability for criminal gun use, supra 
note 1. Thus what I have deemed the natural product reform process, the susceptibility to market including 
claims for product liability, is hindered. 
 65 Eugene Volokh, “Smart Guns”, WASHINGTON POST, (May 22, 2014), (“[P]ersonalized guns that 
couldn’t be fired by anyone who isn’t authorized to use them.”) http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/05/22/smart-guns-2/. 
 66 Some of these ideas may take many years to develop and become economically feasible or may not be 
feasible at all, but the important thing is beginning the process of the change society seeks.  
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Even if stakeholders are unsure or indecisive of the demands they wish to 
seek, simply apprising gun companies that they oppose the current state of gun 
violence and mandate the companies do more to make sure its guns do not fall 
into the wrong hands could be beneficial. These demands may require that they 
are perceived as ultimatums to the gun companies in order to have sufficient 
leverage. Thus if the demands are not reasonably met, the stakeholders must be 
willing to take away their financial support similar to social justice movements 
of the past.67 Stakeholders have the potential to play a critical role, especially 




 67 For example, during the Civil Rights era in Montgomery, Alabama Blacks protested riding segregated 
buses through bus boycotts. Montgomery Bus Boycott, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/black-
history/montgomery-bus-boycott (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). Blacks comprised about 75% of the bus ridership. 
Id. The boycott lasted 381 days until the United States Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision that 
determined that racially segregated buses violated the 14th Amendment. Id. The city faced staggering financial 
losses due to the boycott. The Montgomery Bus Boycott, THENATION.COM, (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://www.thenation.com/learning-pack/montgomery-bus-boycott. The city could have negotiated with the 
leaders of the boycott, but the Mayor tried to intimidate the boycotters by raising cab fare and making 
carpooling illegal. Id.  
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